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ABSTRACT 
Building resilience into today's complex infrastructures is critical to the daily functioning of society and 
its ability to withstand and recover from natural disasters, epidemics, and cyber-threats. This study 
proposes quantitative measures that implement the definition of engineering resilience advanced by the 
National Academy of Sciences. The approach is applicable across physical, information, and social 
domains. It evaluates the critical functionality, defined as a performance function of time set by the 
stakeholders. Critical functionality is a source of valuable information, such as the integrated system 
resilience over a time interval, and its robustness. The paper demonstrates the formulation on two classes 
of models: 1) multi-level directed acyclic graphs, and 2) interdependent coupled networks. For both 
models synthetic case studies are used to explore trends. For the first class, the approach is also applied 
to the Linux operating system. Results indicate that desired resilience and robustness levels are 
achievable by trading off different design parameters, such as redundancy, node recovery time, and 
backup supply available. The nonlinear relationship between network parameters and resilience levels 
confirms the utility of the proposed approach, which is of benefit to analysts and designers of complex 
systems and networks.
Nature Scientific Reports (under review) 
Introduction 
The daily functioning of modern society is necessarily challenging, and traditional risk-based approaches 
to managing critical infrastructure are often criticized for their inability to address widely unknown and 
uncertain threats1–3. Risk-based approaches require developing threat scenarios, evaluating system 
vulnerabilities and quantifying consequences associated with specific failures of system components. In 
the case of an unknown threat space, developing realistic scenarios proves to be an additional challenge. 
Moreover, it may be difficult to justify investing in hardening system components based on hypothetical 
and uncertain threats4. Weaknesses and the potentially misleading nature of risk quantification 
approaches, for example in cyber systems, have been pointed out by a number of researchers5,6. 
Building resilience into infrastructure networks7 has been proposed as the key to protecting 
against the deleterious effect of system disruption due to natural disasters8,9 as well as infrastructure and 
engineering systems’ failures10–13. Not surprisingly, numerous interpretations of resilience have 
sprouted, testifying to the richness of the concept but also presenting challenges for its measurement and 
application1. Yet recent publications and guidance documents14,15 coalesce around the definition of 
resilience provided by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)16: Resilience of a system is its ability 
“to plan and prepare for, absorb, respond to, and recover from disasters and adapt to new conditions”. 
An important feature of resilience captured in this definition is the temporal dimension: the ability to 
recover and retain critical system functionality in response to a wide range of threats, both known and 
unknown. The assessment of resilience should therefore identify the critical functionality of a system 
and evaluate the temporal profile of system recovery in response to adverse events. Resilience 
management should comparatively evaluate cross-domain alternatives designed to enhance the system’s 
ability to (i) plan for adverse events, (ii) absorb stress, (iii) recover and (iv) predict and prepare for future 
stressors in order to adapt to their potential threats. 
Even though definitions of resilience as a system property are commonly reported in the 
literature (see details in Supplement S1, table S1.1), resilience assessment has been implemented in 
structured but largely qualitative or semi-quantitative ways17. Insightful studies quantify resilience with 
metrics associated with different domains and subsequently integrate them into a risk-based evaluation 
or resilience index. For example, Bruneau et al18 identified four dimensions of seismic community 
resilience: technical, organizational, social, and economic. Measures of resilience – robustness, rapidity, 
resourcefulness, and redundancy – were then aggregated in order to minimize a function of the 
probability of system failures, the consequences arising from such failures, and recovery time19. Another 
qualitative but quantifiable approach sets forth a taxonomy for metrics that accommodates both change 
and interaction among physical, informational, and human domains20. The approach applies the 
taxonomy to cyber threats, energy systems and coastal infrastructure9,20,21. Such work provides insight 
and guidance for developing quantitative resilience measures that correspond to the qualitative 
identification of systemic issues and gaps. Unfortunately, it provides only limited insight into the 
management and control of the interconnected networks that constitute the entire system. 
Simultaneously, the field of network science has focused on the challenge of understanding the structure, 
dynamics and vulnerability of multi-layer systems across multilayer networks22–26. 
This paper proposes a methodology for quantifying a system’s resilience that captures the very 
concept of engineering resilience advanced by the NAS27,28 stated above. We make use of the critical 
functionality (CF) (which has been referred to before as functionality function8, performance29,30, 
quality18,31,32), defined as a metric of system performance set by the stakeholders, to derive an integrated 
measure of resilience. One example for CF, among many possible ones, is the percentage of nodes that 
are functioning.  Another is the ratio of a network’s actual flow to its maximum capacity. 
We note that, in addition to resilience, CF is rich in valuable information, and can be the source 
of many quantitative performance metrics, such as the robustness, which we also briefly discuss. For 
application domains, our focus in this paper are the following two classes of models: i) multi-level 
directed acyclic graphs (DAG)33, and ii) interdependent coupled networks34. While the second class of 
network is the subject of intense interest35, the first class of networks, often overlooked by analysts, is of 
interest in many fields, from biology to computer science36–38. As an application of this class, we also 
approximate the Linux, specifically Ubuntu 12.04, code system, as a DAG and estimate its resilience. 
Because obtaining analytical results is an intractable task, even for homogeneous networks, our approach 
is simulation based. We do, however, obtain analytical results in the Methods section for a simple yet 
illuminating special case of the first model, where only nodes without redundant active supply links may 
be unable to supply service. This case sheds light on the relationship between redundancy and system 
resilience. 
Resilience: an analytical definition 
A network is modeled as a graph G(N, L) with a set of nodes N connected by links L. Before considering 
network models, the proposed concept of resilience for complex networks is described generally. The 
specification of N and L includes characteristics relevant to resilience, such as capacity, location, and 
weight of each node and link. Let C be the set of temporal decision rules and strategies to be developed 
in order to improve the resilience of the system during its operation. From a computational viewpoint, 
the parameters and algorithms defined by C depend on the particular model being implemented.  
Ultimately, the system must maintain its critical functionality Κ at each time step t, where Κ 
maps its states or parameters to a real value between 0 and 1. This mapping may, for instance, be linear 
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where {N, L} is the set of all nodes and links, wi (t; C) ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of the relative importance of 
node or link i at time t, and πi (t; C) ∈ [0, 1] is the degree to which a node is still active in the presence of 
an attack. An alternate interpretation defines πi (t; C) as the probability that node or link i is fully 
functional. More complex, nonlinear and detailed definitions of critical functionality mappings are also 
possible. Finally, we introduce the class of adverse events (or potential attacks on targeted nodes) E. For 
instance, in the case of a random attack on two nodes, E is the set of all attacks on all possible node 
pairs. 
Resilience, denoted by R, is a composite function of the network topological properties and their 
temporal evolution parameters defined for a certain critical functionality and a class of adverse events E: 
),,,( ECLNfR =  (2) 
Note that not all targeted nodes are necessarily afflicted. For a non-afflicted attacked node, we thus have 
πi = 1 over the entire time interval of interest. We evaluate R over a certain time interval [0, TC] where TC 
is the control time39 which can be set a priori, for instance, by stakeholders or estimated as the mean 
time between adverse events. In continuous time, we define R as 
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where |E| is the cardinality of set E, and Κnominal(t) is the critical functionality of the system in the case 
where no external events occur (Fig. 1). Equation (3) allows evaluation of the normalized dynamical 
performance of the system before (plan/prepare), during (absorption), and after an attack (recovery and 
adaptation); it intends to capture the definition advanced by the NAS given in the introduction. For 
computational convenience, the above equation is given in discrete time by 
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In most cases, we normalize to Κnominal(t) = 1. Consequently, a normalized measure of resilience may be 
given by 
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We note that equation (1) embraces a large class of performance measures found in the literature. 
For instance, in addition to equation (5), we can also consider the measure 
[ ] ( )CLN ,,;min,0 tKΜ CTt∈= (6)
The above measure is referred to as the Robustness8,40. Alternatively one may define (1 – M) as 
the Risk1. 
Due to the very complex nature of networked systems and the large number of variables defining 
their states, it is not possible to consider all events in the set E and obtain a closed-form expression for R, 
even if all design parameters are made homogeneous across nodes, links, and time. We therefore rely on 
a simulation based approach. Each simulation represents a possible scenario of the networked system’s 
evolution. For each simulation, we calculate the average value of the critical functionality Κ(t,N,L,C) at 
every time step (equation 1), and from there, the resilience (equation 4 or equation 5) over the interval of 
interest. 
The approach proposed builds upon and extends the works of others8,18,29,30,32. The main issue 
encountered when dealing with the estimation of resilience based on the simulation of the system 
performance curves is that those curves in the general case vary depending on the adverse events 
modeled. The current approach to resolve this issue is to extend the techniques of probabilistic risk 
analysis to resilience analysis. This extension provides the weighted average performance curve with 
weights representing the probabilities of the adverse events. 
By contrast, in our approach, we would like to argue that the resilience of the system should not 
be tied to the probabilities of the adverse events to occur. Again, according to the NAS resilience is the 
ability to plan, absorb, recover, and adapt16. Inspired by this definition, we instead simulate the damage 
to the system from a certain adverse event (regardless of the probability for that event to occur) and 
define resilience for that particular damage. For simplicity of decision making, however, we suggest 
considering a certain class of adverse events. For instance, in a networked system we might define one 
class of adverse events as a case when functionality of 4 to 5 nodes is reduced by 40-50% (instead of 
defining a particular adverse event reducing the functionality of specific 4 nodes by 50%). 
We illustrate the approach with two simple models: multi-level DAGs and interdependent 
coupled networks. We assume that homogeneous nodes and links comprising the network have only two 
possible states: active and inactive, meaning wi (t), πi (t) ∈ {0, 1} in equation (1).  To simplify the 
explanation, we focus on node failures, though the concept may be extended to include links. If we 
denote the number of active nodes in the system at time t by A(t) and the total number of nodes in the 
system by N, then the critical functionality simplifies to 
( ) ( ) NtAtK =  (7) 
We first consider a hierarchical multi-level DAG model (Fig. 2) with Λ levels of nodes41,42. We 
investigate how redundancy probability pm, switching probability ps, and the recovery time TR, tradeoff 
parameters at the disposal of the system designer, influence the resilience of a supply-demand multi-
level DAG across levels, nodes, links, and time, how they affect the absorption and recovery phases of a 
network’s resilience profile, and how they address the optimization of network design, for a variety of 
attack scenarios. We also distinguish between cases where switching is instantaneous and delayed by 
one time step. Further description of the model is provided in the Methods (subsection 1). 
Two applications of the DAG model will serve to illustrate the quantitative resilience measure 
introduced, as well as the method for evaluating it: 1) synthetic random hierarchical multi-level supply-
demand directed acyclic graphs, and 2) the Linux, specifically Ubuntu 12.04, software network. The first 
is a useful, if approximate, representation of networks found in many applications36–38,43. The second 
realistically represents an existing and widely used network. 
The second model is derived from the model introduced by Buldyrev et al34 and developed by 
Parshani et al44. They consider a system comprised of two coupled undirected networks (A and B). A 
certain fraction of nodes in network A depends on nodes in the network B (qA) and vice versa (qB). If 
node n in the network A depends on a node m in the network B then node m can only depend on node n 
(or not depend on nodes in the network A at all) (see Methods, subsection 3). Without loss of generality 
we consider scenarios where networks A and B have the same node degree distribution. We present 
results for Erdos-Renyi and scale-free random networks with 800000 nodes (N) and average degree 
(<k>) of 2.5, and slope factor (in the scale-free case) of 2.25. Networks are generated following the 
algorithm presented by Catanzaro et al45. 
We consider a case with a single adverse event that destroys a number of nodes in the network. 
For simplicity, the adverse event happens at the time step t = 0. We shall refer to the result of the adverse 
event as the initial damage. In case of the DAG model we denote the number of nodes that become 
inactive (i.e., are deactivated) in level i between time steps t and t + 1 as tiI . Thus, values 
0
iI  represent 
the number of nodes made inactive upon the occurrence of the adverse event. In case of the coupled 
networks model we denote the fraction of nodes rendered inactive in the network A as pdestr with the 
assumption that the adverse event doesn’t affect the network B. 
 
Results 
Model 1 – Directed acyclic graphs. Synthetic graphs 
We consider a network composed of N = 1000 nodes in four levels: N0 = 32, N1 = 87, N2 = 237, N3 = 
644. We first look at the special case where the switching is instantaneous with probability ps = 1. 
Assuming the overall damage to each level is small compared to the total number of nodes in the level, 
the approximation derived in the Methods section (subsection 2) may be used. Figure 3 provides 
comparisons between the analytical calculations based on that approximation for this case and 
simulation results averaged over 2000 samples. We note that this case provides insight into the impact of 
link redundancy on both critical functionality and resilience over the time interval of interest, as we 
show in the first two scenarios of Fig. 4. 
Examples of resilience profiles for different cases that vary in their initial damage, switching 
probability and recovery time are given in Fig. 4. Case 1 is a scenario where only one node in the upper 
level is initially disabled. This scenario represents, for instance, an accident at a power plant. It follows, 
that the event set E consists of all possible one-node attacks in the upper level. Critical functionality 
suffers minimally; it reduces from 1 to 0.97 at its lowest. Its integral, resilience, consequently suffers 
minimally as well: R = 0.983. By contrast, for a more serious attack, such as in case 2, in which five 
nodes at every level are disabled (such an attack might represent a large earthquake in a certain area); 
both critical functionality and resilience suffer. Critical functionality can be as low as 0.8 (a considerably 
less robust system) for a protracted number of time steps, and resilience is reduced to 0.893. 
For case 3, 10 nodes are disabled, all from the top level, and the switching probability is reduced 
to ps = 0.25. The robustness, or the critical functionality at its lowest, is more drastically reduced to 0.4, 
yielding an overall resilience value of 0.728. Case 4 is similar to case 3, except that the switching is 
delayed, i.e., if node i has become disabled at time t*, then the first attempt to switch is made at time t* 
for case 3, and at time t* + 1 for case 4. 
The dependency of resilience on parameters pm and ps is given in Fig. 5 (a) with the recovery 
time held constant at TR = 0.5TC. The figure shows that both parameters are compatible and combinable; 
they can be smoothly traded off to maintain a desired level of resilience. The designer here has the 
opportunity to select the combination of pm and ps that is least costly. Additionally, increasing pm and ps 
simultaneously has an observable additive effect on resilience. Beyond certain level, however, 
investment in redundancy yields minimal return. For instance, as shown in Fig. 5 (a), doubling the 
probability pm from 0.1 to 0.2 leaves the resilience unchanged for ps > 0.3. 
In addition, there is strong synergy between pm and ps; increasing both factors together produces 
a rapid increase in resilience, but increasing only one or the other variable will cause the resilience 
metric to plateau. This can be observed in Fig. 5 (a) by regarding the resilience values shown across the 
phase diagram curves. 
Figure 5 (b) illustrates that similar tradeoffs can be made between the maximum node recovery 
time TR, and the switching probability ps. The redundancy parameter pm is held constant at 0.01. When 
the recovery time is relatively short, TR < 0.1TC, resilience values close to 1 may be obtained even for 
values of ps as small as 0.05. Resilience is strongly affected by the recovery time, TR (Fig. 5 (b)). This 
temporal factor determines the characteristics of the recovery phase and has a greater impact on the 
calculated resilience than does the potential increase in redundancy. This is particularly true when the 
switching probability ps is low, as Fig. 5 (b) demonstrates. 
Supplement S2 (Figures S2.1 – S2.6) displays additional results for both types of parameter 
dependencies. Cost and speed of design and implementation can now guide the ultimate choice from 
among the infinite possibilities of parameter combinations. 
Model 1 – Directed acyclic graphs. Linux software network 
The Linux software network exemplifies the structure of complex multilevel software systems and is 
important in its own right. This software operates in an estimated 95% of all supercomputing systems46, 
and the majority of the smartphones in use (in the form of the Android operating system). Packages in 
Linux are linked in a formally defined hierarchy of dependencies between individual software units. In 
this hierarchy, a package can only be installed if all required higher level packages have previously been 
installed. Some redundancy is possible when multiple packages provide the same functionality. Fig. 6 
shows a subnetwork of the packages network consisting of 117 nodes out of 36,902 possible nodes in the 
entire network. The graph data were obtained using Advanced Packaging Tool47 on a standard 
installation of the Ubuntu 12.04 system. 
Many modern cyber threats exploit vulnerabilities in software packages. Disabling a targeted 
software package leads to the failure of any services that are dependent on it. Even worse, the recovery 
might be protracted as a result of corrupted user data, thus requiring manual repair and cleanup. For 
example, an attack on the Apache web server might cause it to fail and subsequently send corrupted or 
maliciously designed data to backend databases48. Consequently, services dependent on Apache would 
experience data corruption, and if Apache crashes, it would be disabled as well. While the damaged 
server might be restarted relatively quickly, recovery from such an attack would involve checking the 
data, which gives rise to serious additional delays. 
We evaluate the resilience of the Linux packages network in the presence of both random and 
guided attacks. Critical functionality and resilience profiles for guided attacks on several particularly 
important packages are given in Fig. 7 (a). These packages are: xauth, libstdc++6, libc6, and gcc-4.6-
base. Notably in these four cases there are four sets of adverse events E. Each of these sets contains only 
one event that successfully causes a particular node to be destructed. It is seen that the level of damage 
depends on which packages are targeted.  
For random attacks (Fig. 7 (b)), we consider another set of adverse events, consisting of 36,902 
events. In this case, resilience is significantly higher than in the case of guided attacks due to the low 
importance of many of the nodes that failed from the attacks, thus yielding R = 0.99975 and M = 0.999. 
 
Model 2 – Interdependent networks. Synthetic graphs 
We summarize the results for the second model in the Fig. 8. Panels (a) and (b) show the dependency of 
the critical functionality of a system of two interdependent Erdos-Renyi (ER) networks on time for 2 
distinct cases of the recovery resources available expressed as the number of the backup agents (Nb). As 
it is evidenced by the Fig. 8 depending on the value Nb there is a sharp distinction between two cases: in 
Fig. 8 (a) the system is unable to return to the recovered state and the critical functionality oscillates 
between 0 and about 0.5; due to random duration of cascading recovery and failure processes eventually 
the amplitude of the oscillations of the mean value of CF decreases; in Fig. 8 (b) the backup supply to 
0.4N nodes in the network A allows reaching a stable state after the backup supply removed and further 
recovery of the system. 
In scale-free networks (SF) the results for <k> = 2.5 and N = 800000 (Fig. 8 (d), (e)) show a 
much larger dispersion than in Erdos-Renyi networks. In particular some of those networks suffer a 
much smaller drop in critical functionality in response to the adverse events modeled. This obviously is a 
consequence of the infinite dispersion in degrees distribution in the SF networks (though in our case the 
dispersion is finite due to the finite number of nodes). Another distinct specific trait of the SF networks 
with small value of the average degree is the fact that whether the network fully recovers or not is 
strongly dependent on the stochastic nature of the cascading failure process. Particularly it is obvious 
from Fig. 8 (d) that the success of recovery is determined by whether the most important hubs were 
affected during the deactivation process. If those hubs are not affected the damage is relatively small, 
otherwise the damage results in large drop in critical functionality and no full recovery within the control 
time. 
Finally panels (c) and (f) in the Fig. 8 show the phase diagrams of the dependency of the 
resilience (calculated as the integral of the CF over the control time) on the model parameters pdestr and 
Nb. Notably the critical functionality practically drops to zero for only 0.2 of the nodes destroyed in the 
network A initially (pdestr). Parshani et al44 has demonstrated that if pdestr is more than 0.2545 the network 
experiences the first order transition leading to a state with almost no active nodes. We have reproduced 
their results for the Erdos-Renyi networks and confirmed that if pdestr is less than the threshold of 0.2545 
the transition doesn’t occur. However due to minor modifications we made to the network generation 
algorithms aimed at connecting all the nodes in a single giant component (GC) in the beginning of the 
process, we observe decrease of the threshold value pdestr, causing the first order transition, to about 0.15 
– 0.2. After the drop of the critical functionality (due to the cascading failure) on the step TR the recovery 
process starts. The recovery is successful only if Nb is about 0.4N or higher. Finally if the whole network 
A is destroyed as a result of the adverse event (pdestr = 1) then the recovery cannot start due to the 
absence of the GC (A). Results for the scale-free network show similar tendencies although notably are 
much more disperse in the region [ ] [ ]85.0;05.0,6.0;1.0 ∈∈ destrb pN . We interpret this as the 
consequence of the divergence of the standard deviation of the degree distribution in the scale-free 
networks with ( )3;2∈γ . 
 
Conclusion 
We have presented a detailed approach for implementing the NAS definition of resilience as a function 
of design tradeoff parameters, as illustrated in the study with multi-level directed acyclic graphs and 
interdependent networks. The approach allows evaluation of resilience across time, and not just as a 
single quantity. Designers can thus analyze the effect of parameter choice and design emendations on 
overall network resilience and robustness. Focusing on multi-level directed acyclic graphs and 
interdependent networks, we have demonstrated how network parameters can be traded off to obtain a 
desired resilience and other performance measures’ level. Future work will extend to multiplex systems, 
other real life networks. An important long term challenge is to model adaptation, which is part of the 
response cycle that follows restoration and includes all activities that enable the system to better resist 
similar adverse events in the future. 
 
Methods 
Absorption and recovery algorithms in the DAG model 
A hierarchical multi-level DAG (Fig. 2) has Λ levels of nodes41,42. Each layer is comprised of Ni nodes (i 
= 0, …, Λ – 1). The links represent a supply–demand relationship. A link starts at a supplier node and 
ends at a demander node. Thus, every link in the network is directed. For every level, we identify a set of 
services that all nodes in a particular level supply. Then, for every service supplied in the network, we 
define whether or not it depends on other services and a (possibly empty) list of the dependencies. The 
levels are ordered in such a way that links only go from a higher level i to a lower level j. With this 
convention, i < j, or, the higher the level, the smaller the index. Additionally, no links can be formed 
between nodes in the same level. We also disallow cycles in the network by imposing the following 
constraint: a node cannot depend on any of the services provided by any of the other nodes in its level or 
on any of the services provided in any of the lower levels. Initially, all dependencies are resolved, and 
every node has one incoming link from one or more upper levels on which it depends for the supply of 
its services. Furthermore, for every dependent node and each of its required services, we introduce a list 
of potential suppliers. The probability that a node has a link from each of the potential suppliers is pm. 
Said another way, a node has many links supplying a given service but only one of those links is enabled 
initially (known as real), while the others are contingent backup links (known as virtual), should they 
exist. 
To model an adverse event, we introduce an ability to destruct a node for a time period TR, as was 
recently done by Majdandzic et al39. A destructed node is inactive and is therefore unable to supply 
services until it recovers. Another possible cause of deactivation is an unresolved dependency, that is, 
the absence of a real link to a node supplying a required service. This can happen when the only supply 
node available for a service is either destructed or its upstream supplier is destructed. We shall refer to 
the nodes with an unresolved dependency as disabled nodes. Note that a node can be disabled, 
destructed, or both at a given time. Once a node becomes inactive, all of its dependencies, connected 
through their real links, are subject to deactivation unless they have other real links providing all of their 
required services (Fig. 2).  
We assume that a node is eligible to switch links, that is, to turn a virtual or contingent link into a 
real one, if virtual links for all of the node’s unresolved dependencies exist and the node is not 
destructed. At every time step during which the node is both disabled and eligible to switch, switching 
happens with probability ps. Switching can be either instant (the first attempt to switch is made at the 
same time step the node has become disabled) or delayed (the node with an unresolved dependency 
remains disabled for at least one time step).  
 
Analytical approximation for the special case of the DAG model 
In this section we derive equations describing the number of active nodes in the special case where the 
switching is instantaneous with probability ps = 1 while the initial damage is small compared to the total 
number of nodes in the network. 
Let us denote by Λ the number of levels in the network and by Ni the number of nodes in level i (i 
= 0, …, Λ – 1). We can find the probability that a node in level i has only one service provider in level j 
as follows: 
( )( )11 −−= jNmj pf  (8) 
For the case where the number of deactivated nodes at each time step is small enough or in which 
pm = 0, we may assume that only the nodes with one link for a relevant service are disabled as a result of 
the inactivation of their supplier (thus neglecting the cases in which the node has more than one supplier 
of a service and all of them are deactivated). 
The average number of active nodes in level i at time step t ( tiA ) is given by the formula: 
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We approximate the distribution of 1 / 1−tjA  to be linear in 
s
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Where (under the assumption that the overall damage is small enough): 
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Considering the Taylor expansion of 1 / (1–x), we have for small values of x: 1 / (1–x) ≈ 1 + x. 
Then, on average between steps t and t + 1, we disable the following number of nodes in level i: 
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After the recovery period of TR time steps has transpired, the initially destroyed nodes are rebuilt 
and become active unless they still lack sufficient supplies from the upper levels. Thus, assuming that TR 
> Λ, tiI = 0 for i = {0, …, Λ} and t = {Λ, …, TR – 1}. 
The total number of nodes restored at step TR in level i is given by the expression: 
( )RR Tii
i
iT
i FNN
I
I −=
0
(14)
Here, tiF  represents the total number of nodes disabled in level i at time step t due to the fact that 
they do not have sufficient supplies from the upper levels: 
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And for the next steps, the formula is as follows: 
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Using the formulae above, we may evaluate the average approximated resilience profiles and find 
the values of resilience. 
Absorption and recovery algorithms in the coupled networks model 
The failure propagation algorithms are described in the original model of Buldyrev et al34. Initial damage 
results in a certain fraction of nodes deactivated in the network A. Once those nodes are deactivated the 
network A is fractured in clusters. Nodes that do not belong to the largest cluster of the network A are 
also assumed deactivated. Then all the nodes in the network B that depend on the deactivated nodes in 
the network A are also deactivated. It results in fracturing of the network B, and the nodes that are not in 
the largest cluster of the network B are also assumed deactivated. In the second step of the process nodes 
in the network A depending on the deactivated nodes in the network B are deactivated and the process 
propagates in the same fashion until there are no more nodes to deactivate in any of the networks. 
Recovery is accomplished by the backup supply agents replacing unresolved dependencies of the 
nodes in the first network (A). The number of those agents is denoted Nb. Each backup agent can serve 
only one node at a time. Nodes to provide the backup supply to are chosen randomly from those nodes in 
the network A that depend on a currently inactive node in the network B. Thus backup is provided either 
to all nodes in the network A with an unresolved dependency (in this case full recovery is guaranteed) or 
to Nb nodes only. If a node has backup supply and it is connected to its network’s GC it is activated. 
Once a node is activated it is included in the network’s GC. This causes eventual growth of the giant 
component of the network A. After that the nodes in the network B that depend on the activated nodes in 
the network A and are connected to the GC of the network B are also activated and the process 
propagates in a similar fashion. Once the process is complete the recovery phase finishes. After that the 
backup supply is removed meaning that all the nodes whose supplier in the network B is not active (after 
the recovery phase) are deactivated. This leads to a cascading failure propagating as described in the 
introduction section. Once the failure phase finishes the recovery phase is repeated until the full network 
recovery is established or the control time is reached. 
Let us consider a simple two-network system (Fig. 9). At the beginning of simulation (time 0) 
two nodes (A1 and A3) are assigned to be initially destroyed. Cascading process finishes before the 
recovery time (that is time to repair a node is more than the cascading failure time) TR. Thus at time TR 
the network is in the state it had after the cascading failure. After TR steps have passed the recovery 
process starts. The case of Nb = 0 is shown in the panel (a) of the Fig. 9. In this case the only recoverable 
node is A3. After its recovery node B3 is also recovered, but further recovery is not possible. Nodes A1, 
A2, B1, and B2 can’t be recovered as they have an unresolved dependency. In addition even if nodes A1, 
B1 were independent they still wouldn’t have been recoverable due to the fact that they are not 
connected to the respective networks’ GCs. 
Now consider the case Nb = 1. In this case two scenarios are possible: 
a) The node chosen for backup supply is A1 (Fig. 9 (b)). Then no recovery can happen as this node 
is not connected to the network A GC (or GC(A)) and the recovery phase ends in 0 steps; 
b) The node chosen for backup supply is A2 (Fig. 9 (c)). Then this node recovers, node B2 recovers 
in turn. During the second step of the recovery phase node A1 recovers and node B1 recovers in turn. 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1. Resilience and critical functionality concepts as advanced by the NAS. The system’s resilience 
is evaluated as the integral of the critical functionality’s (K) dependency on time. 
 
Figure 2. Network generation and modeling of an adverse event. The hierarchical area is first defined, 
then links are established according to the Bernoulli trial probability law, with parameter pm. During the 
operation, if a node with a redundant link or links is made inactive, it can switch with probability ps at 
each time step following attack time t. After the repair time period of TR steps elapses following the 
attack, the initially destroyed nodes are restored. 
 
Figure 3. Special case: analytical vs computational solution. Comparison between the analytical 
solution and the computational experiments in the limiting but insightful special case in which switching 
is instantaneous when an additional link is available, meaning that ps = 1, under three different scenarios. 
Initial damage numbers for each layer are ordered as follows: 03
0
2
0
1
0
0 ,,, IIII . For instance, the initial 
damage in scenario 1 is: 100 =I , 0
0
3
0
2
0
1 === III . This special case reveals the impact on resilience of 
redundancy levels, as represented by the probability pm. The cylinder represents the 25–75 percentile 
range. 
Figure 4. Resilience profiles for different scenarios in synthetic graphs. Results are shown for the 
redundancy probability parameter pm = 0.01. Initial damage numbers for each layer are ordered as 
follows: 03
0
2
0
1
0
0 ,,, IIII . For instance, the initial damage in scenario 1 is: 1
0
0 =I , 0
0
3
0
2
0
1 === III . The 
robustness (M) values for scenarios 1 – 4 is the minimum value for each curve: 0.966, 0.787, 0.453, and 
0.395 respectively. 
Figure 5. Resilience as a function of design parameters. (a) Resilience (value shown on curves, σ ∈ 
[3.1E-3; 2.0E-2]) dependencies on switching probability at each time step, or ps, and redundancy 
parameter pm, for a four level hierarchical network where the initial number of destroyed nodes at each 
level is 1600 =I , 0
0
3
0
2
0
1 === III  respectively, and recovery time is held constant at TR = 0.5TC, and (b) 
resilience (σ ∈ [5.9E-4; 4.3E-2]) dependencies on ps and TR for 503020100 ==== IIII with constant pm = 
0.01 (color bar indicates the value of the resilience). 
Figure 6. Subnetwork of the Linux hierarchical packages network. 
Figure 7. Resilience profiles for the Linux network. (a) Guided attacks, and (b) random attacks. It is 
clear that guided attacks are considerably more damaging. Moreover, not all guided attacks are equally 
damaging; as shown in (a), attacks on xauth are less damaging than on libstdc++6. Most damaging are 
attacks on libc6 and gcc-4.6-base. The robustness (M) values for scenarios 1 – 4 in the panel (a) are 
0.982, 0.655, 0.130, and 0.129 respectively, while for the case in the panel (b) M = 0.999. 
Figure 8. Representative profiles of the dynamics of K and resilience in networks with N = 800000. 
Panels (a) and (b) show results for ER networks with pdestr = 0.5, Nb = 0.35N and Nb = 0.4N respectively. 
Panels (d) and (e) show results for SF networks with pdestr = 0.5, Nb = 0.1N and Nb = 0.62N respectively. 
In the panels (a), (b), (d), (e) the solid line corresponds to the mean value of K over 100 simulations. 
Gray area corresponds to the region K ± σ(K) (where σ is the standard deviation). The plot in the panel 
(d) also shows simulations where critical functionality restores to 1. It follows that the success of the 
restoration algorithm depends for the most part only on the results of the cascading failure (rather than 
the random selection of the nodes with the backup supply): in cases when the important hubs are active 
after the cascading failure recovery is more likely. Finally panels (c) and (f) display phase diagrams of 
the resilience dependencies on both Nb and pdestr parameters. In both ER and SF networks the recovery 
process is stochastic and very sensitive to the backup supply available. 
Figure 9. Recovery process in coupled networks. At time 0 nodes A1 and A3 are deactivated for TR 
steps. The failure process finishes before TR so at time TR the network is in its state after the cascade. 
Panel (a) illustrates the case Nb = 0. Only independent node A3 can be recovered as it is connected to the 
network A GC. Once node A3 is activated its dependent node B3 is also activated. Panels (b) and (c) 
illustrate the stochastic nature of the recovery process. In these cases Nb = 1. At time TR + 1 either node 
A1 (b) or node A2 (c) can have backup supply. In case (b) the recovery phase doesn’t start. After that 
backup is removed but cascading failure occurs. On the next time step when backup is applied again to a 
randomly selected node the recovery cascade is possible if the node chosen is A2. This case is the same 
as the case (c) with time TR + 1 (in the case (c)) corresponding to the time TR + 3 (in the case (b)). 
C
ri
ti
c
a
l
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
,
K
0
1
Normalized time, t / Tc0
1 - R
R
P
la
n
A
bs
or
b
R
ec
ov
er
A
da
pt
1
active node inactive node real link virtual link
Initial configuration
1
Some nodes are
destroyed
2
Nodes fail if they don't
have active suppliers
3
Nodes having redundant
incoming links switch
with probability ps
4
Initially destroyed nodes
recover at time t + 1 + TR
5
Initial configuration
is re-established
6
10-2 110-110-3
Redundancy probability, pm
R
e
s
ili
e
n
c
e
,
R
0.5
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.9
1
2
3 1. Damage: 1,0,0,0; TR = 0.5TC.
2. Damage: 5,5,5,5; TR = 0.5TC.
3. Damage: 10,0,0,0; TR = 0.75TC.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
C
ri
ti
c
a
l
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
lit
y,
K
Normalized time, t / TC
1. Damage: 1,0,0,0; TR = 0.5 TC, ps = 1 (instant). R = 0.983.
2. Damage: 5,5,5,5; TR = 0.5 TC, ps = 1 (instant). R = 0.893.
3. Damage: 10,0,0,0; TR = 0.75 TC, ps = 0.25 (instant). R = 0.672.
4. Damage: 10,0,0,0; TR = 0.75 TC, ps = 0.25 (delayed). R = 0.655.
1
2
3
4


0.0 0.2 1.00.4 0.6 0.8
0.0
0.2
1.0
0.4
0.6
0.8
Normalized time, t / TC
C
ri
ti
c
a
l 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
lit
y
, 
K
1. xauth, R = 0.996.
2. libstdc++6, R = 0.907.
3. libc6, R = 0.729.
4. gcc-4.6-base, R = 0.724. 0.9990
0.9988
1.0000
0.9998
0.9996
0.9994
0.9992
C
ri
ti
c
a
l 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
lit
y
, 
K
0.0 0.40.2 1.00.6 0.8
Normalized time, t / TC
a b
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.0
0.2
1 – pdestr
N
b
/
N
Resilience (pdestr , Nb / N)
c
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.0
0.2
1 – pdestr
N
b
/
N
Resilience (pdestr , Nb / N)
f
a
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.8
0.6
1.0
0.4
Normalized time, t / TC
C
ri
ti
c
a
l
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
lit
y,
K
b
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.8
0.6
1.0
0.4
Normalized time, t / TC
C
ri
ti
c
a
l
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
lit
y,
K
d
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.8
0.6
1.0
0.4
C
ri
ti
c
a
l
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
lit
y,
K
Normalized time, t / TC
e
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.8
0.6
1.0
0.4
C
ri
ti
c
a
l
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
lit
y,
K
Normalized time, t / TC
12
3
4
5
A B A B A B
A B
+
A B
1
2
3
4
5
A B A B
TR + 1 TR + 2 TR + 3 TR + 40
A B
+
A B A B
+
A B
1
2
3
4
5
A B A B
TR
a
b
c
